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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CASE NO. 930667-CA 
ROBERT D. SHOWALTER, dba 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC., an 
Ohio corporation, and 
JOHN P. CANNON, individually, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court neglect pertinent elements relating to 
Showalter's damages so as to constitute reversal of the trial 
court's findings of damages? 
2. What is the proper measure of value of Showalter's 
drilling rig? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The trial court found that Plaintiff/Appellant Robert 
Showalter's ("Showalter") damages resulting from the loss of a 
drilling rig due to Defendants/Appellees Cannon Structures and John 
Cannon's ("Cannon") negligence to be $97,000.00. It is this 
finding of the trial court that is the basis of this appeal. In 
fixing damages, the trial court's award will not be set aside 
unless it is manifestly unjust or indicates that the trial court 
neglected pertinent elements, or was unduly influenced by prejudice 
or other extraneous circumstances. Maybe v. Kay Peterson Const. 
Co., Inc., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984); See also Gillmor v. Gillmor, 
745 P.2d 461, cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah App. 1987); Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a); Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 
210 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, April, 1993. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
California Civil Code Section 3333 (West 1982) (Supp. 1993) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1987) (Supp. 1993) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a)(b) (1987) (Supp. 
1993) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(a)(5)(6)(7) (1987) 
(Supp. 1993) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(a) (1987) (Supp. 1993) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Showalter appeals the trial court's finding of damages 
suffered by Showalter resulting from Cannon's negligence in 
transporting Showalter's drilling rig. The trial court found 
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Cannon to be one hundred percent at faultf awarding Showalter 
$97,000.00 in total damages. The court subsequently awarded the 
rig to Cannon. Showalter moved for a new trial on the issue of 
damages, claiming that the court's finding was inconsistent with 
the evidence adduced at trial. The motion was denied and an appeal 
was taken to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Showalter purchased in 1990 a drilling rig for $87,000.00 
plus $10,000.00 for a customs charge. (Tr. at 474.) 
2. The drilling rig was unique because it had special 
features that made it more durable and allowed it to perform 
especially difficult drilling operations. (Tr. at 128, 146, 148, 
189, 216, 221, 230.) 
3. Showalter made certain modifications in the amount of 
$18,800.00 to the rig to allow for smoother operation. (Tr. at 
152, 449, Exhibit 47 ($6,000.00 payment to Carl Martin for purchase 
of drilling augers).) 
4. The drilling rig was used on a job in Kayetna, Arizona for 
Cannon Structures, John Cannon president. (R. at 433.) 
5. Showalter had a contract with Coast-Geo Const. Co. in 
California for drilling operations for which Showalter would have 
made $34,280.00 profit, had it not been for Cannon allowing the rig 
to be lost. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 52.) 
6. An agreement was entered into between Showalter's agent 
and Cannon for Cannon to transport the rig to a job site north of 
the Hearst Castle in California. (R. at 433.) 
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7. While en route to the job site, Cannon negligently allowed 
the rig to break free from the transport trailer and the rig was 
lost down a canyon, destroying the rig. (R. at 430-31.) 
8. Cannon voluntarily commenced repairs to the rig. As of 
the date of trial, he had spent over $321,000.00 towards the repair 
of the rig. (Tr. at 103.) 
9. Showalter brought suit seeking the value of the rig, lost 
profits, interest and costs. (R. at 1.) 
10. A trial was held, Judge Harding of the Fourth District 
presiding. Judge Harding found Cannon to be one hundred percent at 
fault. (R. at 429.) 
11. The trial court found the total damages suffered by 
Showalter to be $97,000.00. (Tr. at 430.) 
12. On February 22, 1993, Cannon made a motion to amend the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to have the court award the 
drilling rig to Cannon. (R. at 438.) 
13. On March 15, 1993, Showalter filed an objection to 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or in the alternative a 
motion for additional trial on the issue of damages pursuant to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 459.) 
14. The trial court then awarded the drilling rig to Cannon. 
(R. at 541.) 
15. Various other pleadings were filed, the trial court making 
its ruling May, 1993. (R. at 587.) 
16. Notice of Appeal was filed on June 16, 1993. (R. at 594.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court found the total damages suffered by Showalter 
as the result of Cannon's negligence to be $97,000.00, this being 
the purchase price of the drilling rig plus $10,000.00 for the 
customs charge. 
It is Showalter's argument that in assessing the amount of 
damages, the trial court neglected pertinent elements found in the 
evidence. First of all, Showalter made certain modifications to 
the rig which the court did not recognize. The court also 
disregarded the testimony of every witness who testified as to the 
rig's value. The court also disregarded clear and certain evidence 
regarding lost profits suffered by Showalter. 
Showalter was extremely fortunate to find a drilling rig for 
the price he paid that had the unique features and capabilities as 
the one destroyed. The trial court took Showalter's good fortune 




THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE 
IN ESTABLISHING A VALUE FOR SHOWALTER'S DRILLING RIG 
At issue here is the value of the drilling rig. The trial 
court found that the value of the drilling rig was the initial 
purchase price of $87,000.00 plus $10,000.00 to get the rig through 
customs, for total damages of $97,000.00. (R. at 430.) It is true 
that the initial purchase price of the rig was $87,000.00 and there 
was another $10,000.00 spent to get it through customs. (Tr. at 
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474.) The base purchase price and the customs charge is all of the 
evidence that can be found to support the trial court's finding of 
damages. It is Showalter's argument that the trial court ignored 
or disregarded clear evidence that shows the value of the drilling 
rig was indeed much higher than the purchase price and that the 
damages suffered as a result of Cannon's negligence are much more 
than the $97,000.00 found by the trial court. 
The trial court found that the laws of the State of California 
applied to the lawsuit. (R. at 430.) Under California law, the 
damages for an action in tort is the amount which will compensate 
for all the detriment proximately caused by the breach of the 
obligation, whether it could have been anticipated or not. 
California Civil Code Section 3333 (West 1982.) 
As recognized in the California case of Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Mounteer, 66 Cal. App. 3d 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977), the 
general rule for tortious injury to personal property is the 
difference between the market value immediately before and after 
the injury, or reasonable costs of repair if that is less than the 
diminution in value. See also Smith v. Hill, 237 Cal. App. 2d 374. 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1965). Pacific Gas & Elec. involved a utility 
company that brought suit against a defendant who negligently 
allowed his vehicle to collide with a utility pole which supported 
the Plaintiff's transmission line. 66 Cal. App. 3d at 811. The 
court stated that the rule stems from the measure of tort damages 
which is the amount which will compensate for all detriment 
proximately caused thereby. £d. in Lauder v. Jobe, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
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63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) the court held that in the absence of 
contrary testimony, the purchase price of a vehicle would be 
sufficient upon which to base a damage award. Id. at 65. Lauder 
involved an automobile accident and consequently an issue as to the 
value of a destroyed automobile. Id. at 64. The defendant 
appealed the trial court's finding that the purchase price was the 
value of the vehicle. The appellate court held that because there 
was no contrary evidence presented at trial, the purchase price was 
a sufficient basis upon which to place a value. Icl. at 65, 66. 
In the present case, there was overwhelming evidence at trial 
presented by both sides to show that the value of the drilling rig 
was much higher than the purchase price of $87,000.00. First, the 
owner, Showalter, testified that in his opinion, the rig was worth 
$600,000.00 because that is what one like it would cost to buy in 
the United States. (Tr. at 456.) Showalter felt that it was a 
good deal at $87,000.00 and that was why he participated in the 
purchase of the rig. (Tr. at 456.) Joe Carl, an expert witness, 
testified that the replacement value of a rig such as the one 
destroyed in this case would be $600,000.00. (Tr. at 149.) Carl 
Martin, who at one time had an ownership interest in Showalter's 
rig, valued it at $650,000.00 - $700,000.00. (Tr. at 382.) 
Implicit in Defendant Cannon's testimony was that he also 
valued the rig for much more than $87,000.00. He testified that he 
voluntarily spent over $321,000.00 towards the repair of the rig as 
of the date of trial. (Tr. at 103.) Why would Cannon spend this 
amount on the rig if he believed the value to be much less? Cannon 
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also testified that he insured the rig for $151,000.00. (Tr. at 
487.) When asked how he arrived at that value, he stated: "I made 
my own judgment on that." (Tr. at 487.) 
Cannon's expert, John Lacy, testified that the value of the 
rig was $62,250.00. (Tr. at 283.) Lacy, however based this value 
on taking the rig's purchase price and applying twenty-five percent 
depreciation. (Tr. at 283.) It is Showalter's argument that this 
analysis is inherently flawed. The analysis is based on the 
premise that the actual value of the rig at the time of purchase 
was the purchase price. In other words, the same analysis could be 
applied to a purchase price of one million dollars and a value of 
over $700,000.00 would be arrived at. Moreover, there was 
testimony presented that drilling rigs of this type actually 
appreciate in value rather than depreciate. (Tr. at 192, 209.) 
On cross-examination Lacy testified as to the value of some of 
the components of the rig. Lacy stated a hoist would cost 
$25,000.00 (Tr. at 305); $20,000.00 for an engine (Tr. at 306); 
$150,000.00 for a hydraulic system (Tr. at 306-07); $15,000.00 for 
a rotary table (Tr. at 308); $50,000.00—$100,000.00 for a derrick 
(Tr. at 310); $50,000.00 for a bearing (Tr. at 311); $7,000.00 each 
for torque converters (Tr. at 311); etc. And there were many other 
expensive components that made up the rig that Lacy never testified 
to. Indeed, as was mentioned above, Cannon had spent over 
$321,000.00 in an attempt to replace some of the components as of 
the date of trial and the repairs were still incomplete. (Tr. at 
312.) 
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Another expert, Stanley Anderson, also one of Cannon's expert 
witnesses, testified in a deposition that a rig with comparable 
applications to the one destroyed would cost $425,000.00. (R. at 
609; Deposition of Stanley Anderson at 13-14.) Anderson also 
testified that he had put $200,000.00 into rebuilding a similar 
rig. (Id. at 22.) 
Finally, Showalter had spent, in addition to the purchase 
price and customs charges, another $12,800.00 for modifications to 
the rig. (Tr. at 219, 227, 449.) These modifications were in 
addition to the purchase price of $87,000.00 and the customs price 
of $10,000.00. It should be noted that Cannon also spent $6,000.00 
for augers that are used on the rig. (Plaintiff's exhibit 47.) 
This expense however is shown as a check written out to Carl 
Martin. The court refused to accept this exhibit. (Tr. at 471.) 
Utah law on damages for the destruction of personal property 
is measured by the market value at the time of the destruction. 
This rule was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Winters v. 
Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453 (Utah 1978). Winters involved 
a plaintiff who entrusted a bracelet for repairs to the defendant 
jeweler. Id. at 454. The bracelet was subsequently lost or stolen 
from the defendant. £d. The trial court returned a judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $8,180.00 plus costs and 
interest. Id. The defendant appealed, claiming that the award of 
damages was excessive. Id. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The general rule is that damages awarded for personal 
property that is taken or destroyed are based on the 
item's market value at the time of the taking or 
destruction. Ordinarily, market value is defined as the 
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price for which an article is bought and sold and for 
which there exists a demand in the market place, and the 
legal definition of the price is retail, not wholesale. 
If however there is no demand for the item, the recovery 
is based on actual value, or in the case of unique 
chattels, value to the owner. 
Id. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) 
The record shows absolutely that Showalter's drilling rig was 
a unique item. (Tr. at 128, 146, 148, 189, 216, 221, 230.) The 
rig was uniquely constructed as to enable it to perform difficult 
drilling operations. Id. Showalter, the owner, testified that he 
felt the rig was worth $600,000.00 right before it went down the 
canyon. (Tr. at 456.) Showalter spent large sums of money beyond 
the initial purchase price and customs charge. Exhibit 47, which 
the trial court refused to admit, is documentation as to some of 
the monies spent by Showalter towards the rig. He spent large sums 
of money on his agent, Carl Martin, who was the operator of the 
rig. Showalter did this because he felt he could recapture all of 
his capital and make significant profits if he sold the rig or by 
using the rig for construction jobs. (Tr. at 457-63.) Evidence of 
the rig's profit potential was exhibited by the profit it made or 
would have made but for Cannon losing the rig. The job for Cannon 
in Arizona provided Showalter with a net profit of $32,437.00. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 53.) Showalter would have made an additional 
$34,280.00 profit on the Coast-Geo job. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 52.) 
Again, the value of this unique chattel to Showalter, as owner, was 
$600,000.00. (Tr. at 456.) 
Assuming arguendo that Showalter's rig is not determined to be 
a unique chattel, clear and certain evidence is found in the record 
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to show that replacement cost for a rig that would have some of the 
same capabilities as the one destroyed would be $425,000.00 or 
more. Cannon's own expert witness, Stanley Anderson testified to 
this. (R. at 609 - Deposition of Stanley Anderson at 13-14.) 
Another of Cannon's expert witnesses, John Lacy testified as to 
some of the component costs on the rig being in excess of 
$400,000.00 (Tr. at 305-11.) Cannon himself spent over 
$321,000.00 in an attempt to repair the rig, and the repairs were 
still incomplete. Joe Carl, Showalter's expert, stated that the 
rig was worth $600,000.00 before it was destroyed. (Tr. at 149.) 
Additionally, Carl Martin stated the rig's value was $650,000.00 -
$700,000.00. (Tr. at 382.) 
In summary of this point, the only evidence in the record to 
support the trial court's finding of the rig's value and ultimately 
of Showalter's damages in this case is the rig's initial purchase 
price plus the customs charge. Even this finding was in error, 
however, because of Showalter's modifications. Every witness that 
testified as to the rig's value stated it was worth more than the 
value the trial court found. Showalter simply made a good deal on 
his purchase. The trial court's finding of value and its 
subsequent award of the rig to Cannon took Showalter's good deal 
and gave it to Cannon. By awarding the rig to Cannon, the trial 
court in essence rewarded Cannon for his negligence. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED CLEAR AND CERTAIN EVIDENCE 
AS TO THE LOSS OF SHOWALTER'S FUTURE PROFITS 
The trial court found that Showalter's business was a new 
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business and that damages suffered due to lost profits were 
speculative and therefore, not recoverable. (R. at 430.) 
California law provides that lost profits are recoverable in 
an action based on injury to personal property. In J'Aire Corp. v. 
Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979), the California Supreme Court 
recognized a plaintiff's right to lost profits in a case such as 
the present one. J'Aire Corp. involved a claim for lost profits 
resulting from a delay in completion of a construction project at 
plaintiff's restaurant. Id. at 62. The court stated that where 
negligent conduct causes injury to real or personal property, the 
plaintiff may recover damages for profits lost during the time 
necessary to repair or replace the property. Id. at 63. 
(Citations omitted.) 
In this case Cannon was found one hundred percent at fault in 
causing the injury to Showalter's rig. (R. at 429.) Cannon 
damaged the rig while transporting the rig to one of Showalter's 
job sites in California. Showalter testified at trial that in one 
year he would have made a net profit of $112,600.00 from the rig 
using it only part time. (Tr. at 460.) Showalter had a contract 
with Coast-Geo Contractors, Inc. to perform certain drilling 
operations using the rig. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 52.) Showalter 
would have made $34,280.00 profit on this job had it not been for 
Cannon's negligence which caused the destruction of Showalter's 
rig. (Id.) The loss of future profits as to this contract with 
Coast-Geo was clear and certain, with no element of speculation. 
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It appears that the trial court completely disregarded this 
evidence. 
Cannon argued at trial, and it is anticipated that he will 
argue again on appeal that Showalter's contract with Coast-Geo was 
unenforceable because Showalter had not obtained a California 
construction permit as of the date of the accident. Showalter 
testified at trial, however, that he was going to operate under 
Coast-Geo's permit. (Tr. at 467.) Even assuming, arguendo,, 
however that Showalter could not sue to enforce the contract, he 
still would have had an action in quantum meruit against Coast-Geo 
should it have chosen not to honor the contract. It is patently 
unfair and unjust to allow Cannon to escape liability for clear and 
certain damages merely because he speculates as to Showalter's 
chances of not getting paid. 
Further certainty of Showalter's lost profits was the profit 
Showalter had previously made on a job performed for Cannon 
himself. On that job, Showalter made a net profit of $32,437.00. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 53.) Cannon also had a job for Showalter's 
rig in Saguaro, New Mexico that Cannon wanted to do after the rig 
was repaired. (Tr. at 267-8.) 
Although it could be conceivably argued that Showalter's 
business was new, his business had shown a healthy profit on the 
job for Cannon and would have done so again on the Coast-Geo job as 
well. Even assuming however, that profits on future jobs were not 
certain, the job with Coast-Geo was certain as were the profits. 
At a minimum, the trial court should have allowed for the 
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$34,280.00 net profit Showalter would have made but for Cannon's 
negligence which caused the loss of the rig. 
POINT III 
SHOWALTER'S REQUESTED DAMAGES 
Showalter requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
finding of damages and assess an amount that is commensurate with 
the evidence adduced at trial. This amount should reflect the true 
value of the rig, lost profits and costs. 
Showalter asserts that the value of the rig was $600,000.00 as 
he testified as owner of this unique chattel. (Tr. at 456.) Joe 
Carl, an expert witness, also testified that the rig was worth 
$600,000.00. (Tr. at 149.) Carl Martin stated the rig was worth 
$650,000.00-$700,000.00. (Tr. at 382.) John Lacy, Cannon's 
expert, on cross-examination testified as to some of the components 
that made the rig. (Tr. at 306-11.) Following Lacy's testimony to 
its logical conclusion, it would also indicate a value in excess of 
$600,000.00. In the alternative, a cost of a rig that had roughly 
the same drilling capabilities as did Showalter's would cost 
$425,000.00. This figure was testified to by Cannon's expert, 
Stanley Anderson. (R. at 609; Deposition of Stanley Anderson at 
13-14.) The final repair value would be close to $400,000.00, as 
Cannon had spent $321,000.00 as of the date of trial and the 
repairs were still incomplete. (Tr. 312.) The modifications and 
expenditures on the rig should also be added. This amount being 
$16,800.00, the cost of modifications to the rig and the augers. 
(Tr. at 219, 227, 449; Plaintiff's Exhibit 47.) Additionally, the 
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customs charge of $10,000.00 should also be granted. (Tr. at 430.) 
In summary as to the value of the rig, Showalter asks that this 
Court grant a value of $600,000.00 to the rig, or alternatively 
$425,000.00. In addition to either of these values, this Court 
should also allow for the customs charge of $10,000.00 plus the 
modifications of $16,800.00. 
Next, Showalter requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's finding that there were no damages attributable to lost 
profits. Showalter asks this Court to find lost profits in the 
amount of $112,600.00, this figure representing the net profit for 
one year. (Tr. at 460.) In the alternative, Showalter requests 
the lost profits from the Geo-Coast job in the amount of 
$34,280.00. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 52.) 
CONCLUSION 
Showalter purchased the drilling rig at what he felt like was 
an excellent buy, in light of the uniqueness of the rig. He spent 
large sums of money modifying the rig and financing his agent to 
arrange drilling jobs. He put forth this additional capital 
because he felt the rig's value to be many times more than the 
purchase price and that through either selling the rig or using it 
on drilling jobs, Showalter would retrieve his capital plus a large 
profit. The jobs the rig performed proved this theory correct. 
Every witness who testified stated the rig was worth more than 
the purchase price. Cannon himself voluntarily spent over 
$321,000.00 to repair the rig and the repairs were still 
incomplete. The trial court disregarded every witness' testimony 
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and assigned the purchase price as the rig's value and, 
consequently, as Showalter's measure of damages. The trial court 
also disregarded the clear and certain profits Showalter would have 
made had Cannon not lost the rig. 
By the trial court disregarding clear and convincing evidence 
as to Showalter's damages, the court took Showalter's good deal and 
gave it to Cannon. This Court must accordingly reverse the trial 
court's finding of damages, and assess damages in the amounts 
requested. 
DATED this ] l| day of December, 1993. 
hi 
LONI F. DeLAND 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
fa 
ROBERT D. SHOWALTER, 
dba ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC. 
a Ohio corporation, and 
JOHN P. CANNON, individually, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
C O M P L A I N T 
C i v i l N o . 1 "Z-O^O-Q / 0 S 
Judge 
Plaintiff complains of defendants and alleges as 
follows: 
1. Defendant corporation is incorporated under the 
laws of the State of Ohio and is qualified to do business in 
the State of Utah. 
2. John S. Cannon is the authorized registered agent 
of the corporate defendant in the State of Utah. 
3. On or about December 6, 1991, John P. Cannon as an 
authorized agent of defendant corporation was transporting a 
A. 
drilling rig from Kayenta, Arizona to California as a contract 
carrier. 
4. John P. Cannon negligently operated a tractor -
lowboy trailer in such a fashion to let the rig break loose of 
its attachments and fall down a canyon. 
5. The rig in question has been damaged beyond 
reasonable repair. 
6. The value of replacing said rig is approximately 
ONE MILLION DOLLARS ($1,000,000.00). 
7. Plaintiff has lost substantial earnings from the 
loss of said rig in amounts to be determined by the trier of 
fact. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests judgment against 
defendants jointly and severally in the sum of ONE MILLION 
DOLLARS ($1,000,000.00) being the value of the drilling rig 
and loss of profits in amounts to be determined by the trier 
of facts, interest, costs and such other relief as is 
equitable and just. 
DATED this N day of February, 1992. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
ROBERT M. MCRAE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
r- -. '! 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. SHOW ALTER, dba ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN DRILLING, 
Plaintiff, CASE NUMBER: 920400108 PD 
vs. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC., an Ohio CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
corporation, and JOHN P. CANNON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
After full consideration of the evidence and oral arguments presented at the trial of 
this case, the Court finds and concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about December 1, 1991, plaintiff had in his employment and under his 
supervision Carl D. "Pete" Martin at all times relevant herein and who is admitted agent of 
plaintiff. 
2. Said Martin had been working an auger drill rig owned by plaintiff which had 
B. 
been under contract with defendants in Kayenta , Arizona. 
3. On or about, but prior to December 6, 1991, plaintiffs agent, Martin, entered 
into a verbal agreement with defendants to transport plaintiffs drill rig from Kayenta, 
Arizona to a location on U.S. Highway 1, north of San Simeon and north of the Hearst 
Castle, California, to a road location currently under construction with the State of California 
for an agreed price of $5,250.00. 
4. The cost of the transportation was to be deducted from monies owed by 
defendants to plaintiff for the Kayenta, Arizona job. 
5. Defendants were licensed by the Federal DOT as licensed contract carriers of 
goods in interstate commerce. 
6. During the course of transporting plaintiffs drill rig, the individual defendant 
Cannon was operating said tractor lowboy /trailer combination on behalf of the corporate 
defendant. 
7. Prior to commencing the haul from Arizona to the designated location in 
California, Defendants obtained all of the necessary permits and selected the route to travel. 
8. Cannon's own notes verify he knew the location of the job-site to the north of 
San Simeon and the "Hearst Castle." 
9. Messrs. Cannon and Martin had agreed that Mr. Martin would meet Mr. Cannon 
on California Highway 1 at San Simeon to show Mr. Cannon the jobsite. 
10. On the afternoon of December 6, 1991, Mr. Cannon met Mr. Martin at his 
motel in San Simeon, California as had been previously arranged. 
11. Mr. Martin drove ahead of Mr. Cannon along Highway 1 from San Simeon. 
12. Thereafter, Mr. Cannon passed a sign which read "TRACTOR - SEMIS OVER 
30 FEET KINGPIN TO READ AXLE NOT ADVISED - NEXT 88 MILES." Mr. Cannon 
continued to follow Mr. Martin. This tractor-trailer combo was 101'4". 
13. During the course of travel on U.S. Highway 1, defendants drove their 
tractor/trailer combination in such a way as to lose the loaded drill rig down a canyon side, 
damaging the subject drill rig. 
14. Defendant's operation of the truck/trailer combination by failing to use mirrors to 
assist with guiding the tractor/trailer unit, permitting the left rear to be suspended in mid air 
were in violation of the duties of an ordinary prudent trucker holding himself out as a 
common carrier of the type of equipment being transported. 
15. From April of 1990 to December of 1991 plaintiff attempted to use the rig on 
several construction projects. Most of the projects fell through, but plaintiff was able to 
obtain work on two projects. Plaintiff paid $40,000 to another company to obtain the other 
company's right to the work. 
16. In the winter of 1990/1991, plaintiff spent approximately $12,000 for a rig 
maintenance repair and regearing. Repair included the stopping of leaking hydraulic fluids. 
17. Mr. Showalter was willing to sell the rig for what he had invested in it. 
18. Plaintiff never made any money from the rig, his costs being greater than his 
income. 
19. Plaintiff was attempting to sell the rig but had been unable to do so. 
20. Plaintiffs business was new and not well established. 
21. Plaintiff has been damaged as follows: 
a. For the total loss of the subject drill rig having a value of $97,000 
(purchase price plus customs and shipping costs). 
22. The Court finds that Defendants undertook repairs of said drill rig at their own 
expense and without any authority from the plaintiff, and therefore any claims asserted by 
defendants against plaintiff by virtue of their counterclaim are without merit. 
23. The Court further finds that repairs undertaken to date by defendants have been 
inadequate and no tender has been made to plaintiff by defendants of a totally restored drill 
rig to its former condition prior to defendants' negligent damages. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court having made the foregoing findings of fact now enters its conclusions of 
law as follows: 
1. The laws of the State of California apply to this lawsuit. 
2. Defendants are guilty of negligence in the operation of their tractor/trailer 
combination in driving the same off the travel portion of the road and failure to observe 
proper safety techniques such as the use of rear view mirrors to insure a safe path of travel. 
3. Having found that plaintiffs business is new and unestablished, the court 
concludes that plaintiffs business losses are too speculative for recovery: 
In allowing damages for loss of profits due to an injury to a business, either by 
breach of a contract or commission of a tort, the law makes a distinction 
between established and new businesses, in keeping with the general rule that 
such damages, in order to be recoverable , must be reasonably certain and not 
speculative or remote. . . . 
A loss of prospective profits from an unestablished business, either 
from a breach of contract or from the commission of a tort, is considered too 
uncertain to merit compensation. 
23 CAL. JUR. Damages § 81 (citations omitted). 
4. Plaintiff has sustained general damages for the value of the drill rig in the sum of 
$97,000. 
5. Applying California's "pure" comparative negligence standard, the Court 
concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants the total damages sustained 
by the plaintiff as a result of the accident times the percentage of defendants' negligence. 
Having found that defendants were 100% negligent, and that plaintiff was not negligent, the 
Court concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the full sum of $97,000 from the 
defendants. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to interest from the date of occurrence, December 6, 1991, 
until date of judgement as provided by California law, together with costs of suit. 
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare a judgement within 15 days of this decision in 
accordance with the foregoing findings and conclusions and submit it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Dated this 1st day of February, 1993. 
cc: Robert M. McRae, Esq. 
Lynn B. Larsen, Esq. 
Gregory J. Sanders, Esq. 
Lynn B. Larsen #3906 
LARSEN & STEWART 
1000 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 355-5300 
Gregory J. Sanders #2858 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. SHOWALTER, ] 
dba ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
-v- ; 
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC., 
an Ohio corporation, and 
JOHN P. CANNON, individually 
Defendants 
I MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 Civil No. 920400108PD 
I Judge: Ray M. Harding 
Defendant Cannon Structures, Inc. (Cannon) moves the 
court to amend its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to 
specifically address Defendant's entitlement to the damaged rig 
which, in Plaintiff's words ,#has been damaged beyond reasonable 
repair." (Complaint f 5). 
In support of said motion Defendant notes that the court 
found Plaintiff had been damaged for the total loss of the drill 
rig; that the drill rig had a value of $97,000; and that Plaintiff 
was entitled, therefore, to recover the full sum of $97,000 from 
C. 
the Defendants. (Findings K 21 and Conclusions J5 4 and 5). 
With the obligation of Defendants to reimburse Plaintiff 
for the full value of the damaged rig, then the rig and whatever 
salvage value it may have belongs to the Defendants. To avoid any 
question that may arise in the future in this regard, Defendants 
respectfully request that the court either amend its Findings and 
Conclusions or address the issue in the Judgment. 
Furthermore, as more fully discussed in Defendants' 
objection to the Plaintiff's proposed form of judgment, prejudgment 
interest is not appropriate under "California Law," in this case. 
See Polster v. Swing, 210 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1985) and cases cited 
therein. (Copy attached to Defendants' Objection to Plaintiff's 
Proposed Form of Judgment.) 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of February, 1993. 
LARSEN & STEWART 
(jLynnl B'/^Larsen 
^10 East South Temple, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Counsel for Defendants 
cannon\4105p.19 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I had served a copy of the foregoing 
MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the 
below listed this 22nd day of February, 1993, by U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid. 
Robert M. McRae, Esq, 
McRAE & DeLAND 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
^^Tt^Cif CQ^y<^^ 
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Lynn B. Larsen #3906 
LARSEN & STEWART 
1000 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 355-5300 
Gregory J. Sanders #2858 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. SHOWALTER, ] 
dba ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING ] 
Plaintiff, 
_v-
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC., 
an Ohio corporation, and 
JOHN P. CANNON, individually ; 
Defendants 
| DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO 
i PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FORM 
i OF JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 920400108PD 
i Judge: Ray M. Harding 
On February 19, 1993, counsel for Defendants received from 
counsel for Plaintiff a proposed form of judgment. Defendants 
believe that the judgment should be modified in the following ways: 
1. The judgment should specify that the damaged rig now 
belongs to Defendants. Following receipt of the courts Findings of 
Fact and Conclusion of Law, counsel for Defendants discussed this 
matter with counsel for Plaintiff. Counsel for Plaintiff verbally 
agreed to address the disposition of the rig in his proposed form 
of judgment. The proposed form does not address that issue. As 
D. 
such, Defendants respectfully request the judgment form be modified 
to indicate Defendants entitlement to the damaged rig. 
2. Plaintiff's claim for interest is excessive. The court 
found that Plaintiff was entitled to interest "as provided by 
California law." California law allows prejudgment interest only on 
"damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation. 
. . except during such time as the debtor is prevented. . . by the 
act of the creditor from paying the debt." California Civil Code § 
3287. In the instant case, Plaintiff sought damages in excess of $1 
million for a rig which had cost $80,000 and for which the court 
found had a value of $97,000, and from which no profits had been 
generated during the year and a half of its use. Such an excessive 
claim by the creditor prevented the paying of the obligation and 
negates "by California law" any prejudgment interest. See Polster 
Inv. v. Swing, 210 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1985) where the Complaint sought 
$55,000 and damages of $7,836 were awarded. The court concluded 
"This large discrepancy is inconsistent with a sum certain or 
capable of being made certain at the time of the breach which was 
the basis of this civil action." For the convenience of the court, 
Defendants have attached to this pleading a copy of the pertinent 
provisions of the California Civil Code and the Polster case. 
3. Defendants also object to the alleged "cost of suit in 
the sum of $2,492.61" included by Plaintiff in the form of 
judgment. Defendants do not agree with the Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements, as more specifically discussed in the accompanying 
- 2 -
motion of Defendants challenging the bill of costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of February, 1993, 
LARSEN & STEWART 
Lyrtni B. M^arsen 
10 East South Temple, #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Counsel for Defendants 
cannon\A105p.20 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I had served a copy of the foregoing 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FORM OF JUDGMENT FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the below listed this 22nd day of 
February, 1993, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
Robert M. McRae, Esq. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
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164CaLApp3d427 POLSTER, INC. v. SWING 
Cite as 210 CaLRptr. 567 (Cal.App. 2 Dlst. 1985) 
case this court found prejudice where a 
defendant was prevented from testifying 
by Beagle error, and his alibi witnesses 
could not account for his whereabouts dur-
ing the entire relevant time period. Sim-
ilarly, in this case the testimony of alibi 
witnesses, though substantially accounting 
for defendant's whereabouts, presented 
vulnerabilities easily exploited by the pros-
ecution. 
Further, in contrast to Fisher, defendant 
did not put on a "complete" defense in that 
the assertions of Jenkins concerning his 
assaultive behavior one week previous to 
the incident went unrebutted. The most 
logical witness to respond to those asser-
tions would have been defendant, himself; 
yet he could have done so only at the peril 
of having the jury learn of his prior murder 
conviction. 
567 
164 Cal.App.3d 427 
jPOLSTER, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Carol SWING; Ronald Swing; Carol's In-
teriors, Inc., a California corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Civ. B004809. 
Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division 3. 
Feb. 6, 1985. 
Lastly, the closeness of the evidence and 
the existence of sharp conflicts in the testi-
mony herein are additional factors to be 
weighed in determining prejudice. (People 
v. Anderson (1978) 20 Cal.3d 647, 651, 143 
CaLRptr. 883, 574 P.2d 1235; People v. 
Underwood (1964) 61 Cal.2d 113, 125-126, 
37 CaLRptr. 313, 389 P.2d 937.) In Fisher 
the prosecution case was quite strong, con-
sisting of the victim's testimony corrobo-
rated by two additional eyewitnesses—one 
to events immediately before the crime and 
the other to events just after. The notable 
weaknesses in the prosecution evidence 
herein, particularly the lack of highly credi-
ble eyewitness testimony, render this case 
considerably closer. 
Thus, on the facts of this record and for 
the reasons stated above, we conclude that 
there is a reasonable likelihood defendant 
would have attained a more advantageous 
result but for Beagle error at trial. 
Defendant's convictions are reversed, 
and the matter is remanded for a new trial 
consistent with this opinion. 
THOMPSON, Acting PJ., and JOHN-
SON, J., concur. 
Lessor filed complaint against former 
lessee for breach of contract and conver-
sion arising from return of leased premises 
in damaged condition. The Superior Court, 
Los Angeles County, Robert M. Letteau, J., 
awarded damages plus prejudgment inter-
est to the lessor. The lessee appealed. 
The Court of Appeal, Danielson, J., held 
that: (1) the state in which the premises 
were returned to the lessor clearly breach-
ed the covenant to return the premises in 
as good a condition as when leased, except-
ing normal wear and tear; (2) the trial 
court properly utilized the estimated cost 
of repairs as the measure of damage re-
sulting from the lessees' breach of the cov-
enant to restore; (3) the lessor's act in 
renting the premises to successor tenant at 
reduced rent could be construed as an at-
tempt to mitigate damages; (4) the lessee 
failed to meet its burden of proving that 
the lessor failed to mitigate its damages; 
and (5) the lessor was not entitled to recov-
er interest from the date that the right to 
recover or the breach of covenant vested. 
Affirmed in part; stricken in part. 
1 Landlord and Tenant <s=»160(2) 
While lessee is not obligated to reno-
vate premises at expiration of his lease, or 
restore premises to his lessor in better 
condition than they were at outset of his 
lease, state in which premises were re-
turned to lessor clearly breached covenant 
to return premises in as good a condition as 
when leased, excepting normal wear and 
tear, where record contained substantial 
568 210 CALIFORNIA REPORTER 164 Cal.App.3d 427 
evidence of damage to dropped ceiling, ceil-
ing tiles, lighting fixtures, ceiling support 
bars, interior walls and front door sill and 
jamb. 
2. Landlord and Tenant <s=160(4) 
Trial court properly utilized estimated 
cost of repairs to leased premises as mea-
sure of damage resulting from lessees' 
breach of covenant to restore premises to 
lessor in as good a condition as when 
leased, excepting normal wear and tear, 
even though lessor itself did not actually 
make repairs. 
3. Damages <s=*62(4) 
Lessor injured by breach of contract 
must mitigate his damages. 
4. Damages <3=>62(4) 
Lessor's act in renting premises previ-
ously leased and returned in damaged con-
dition to successor lessee at reduced rent! 
could be construed as attempt to mitigate] 
damages. I 
5. Damages «=62(4) 
Test as to whether lessor satisfied his 
duty to mitigate damages was whether he 
acted reasonably and in good faith in relet-J 
ting property for less than rent provided in I 
original lease after original lessee returned 
property in damaged condition. I 
6. Damages e=>62(4) 
Lessee failed to meet its burden ofl 
proving that lessor failed to mitigate its' 
damages sustained when lessee returned 
leased premises in damaged condition 
where lessor produced evidence showing it 
realized that it either had to make repairs 
or make rent concessions in successor 
lease, and that, under lessor's financial cir-
cumstances then prevailing, it would be 
better for it to make such concessions. 
7. Interest *=>39(2) 
Statute which allows person entitled to 
recover damages certain also to recover 
interest does not authorize prejudgment in-
terest as a matter of law where amount of 
damages depends upon judicial determina-
tion based upon conflicting evidence. 
West's Ann.CaLCiv.Code § 3287(a). 
8. Interest <£=39(2) 
Prejudgment interest runs from date 
when damages are certain or are capable of 
being calculated to a certainty. 
9. Interest <s=19(l) 
If debtor does not know or cannot 
readily compute damages, creditor must 
supply him with statement and supporting 
data so debtor can ascertain damages. 
West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 3287(a). 
10. Interest <s=19(l) 
Where there is large discrepancy be-
tween amount of damages demanded in 
complaint and size of eventual award, that 
fact militates against finding of certainty 
mandated in order to recover interest from 
date right to recover certain damages vest-
ed. West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 3287(a). 
11. Interest <S=>19(1) 
Amount due lessor was not sum cer-
entitlement to interest on damages so that 
lessor was not entitled to recover interest 
from date that right to recover damages 
for return of leased premises in damaged 
condition vested, where amount of original 
demand was $55,000 and amount eventual-
ly found due after receipt of all evidence 
was $7,836. West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code 
§ 3287(a). 
12. Appeal and Error <3=*418 
Jurisdiction of Court of Appeal is limit-
ed in scope to notice of appeal and judg-
ment or order appealed from. 
13. Appeal and Error <s=839(l) 
Court of Appeal did not reach subject 
of court-awarded attorney fees where judg-
ment appealed from made no mention of 
attorney fees. 
Nathan Goller, Los Angeles, for defend-
ants and appellants. 
Raiskin & Revitz and Steven J. Revitz, 
Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent 
164CaLApp3d431 POLSTER, I 
Cite as 210 CaLRptr. S< 
j42t jDANIELSON, Associate Justice. 
Defendants, Carol and Ronald Swing and 
Carol's Interiors, Inc. ("Carol's Interiors" 
or lessee), interior designers, appeal from a 
judgment in favor of plaintiff, Polster, Inc. 
("Polster" or lessor) for damages and an 
award of pre-judgment interest, for defend-
|43o ants' failure to return i leased property to 
plaintiff in the same condition as received. 
We affirm the judgment in part and re-
verse it in part. 
FACTS 
On February 5, 1974, Polster and Carol's 
Interiors entered into a written lease of a 
store located in Sherman Oaks, California 
for the term of five years. ^ Carol's Interi-
ors was to conduct a retail furniture store 
and interior decorating business on the 
premises. The lease provided that the les-
see must surrender the premises at the 
expiration of the term of the lease in the 
same condition as when received, reason-
able use and wear thereof excepted. Upon 
taking possession, Carol's Interiors remod-
eled the interior of the premises over a 
period of six to eight months for use as an 
interior design studio and to display fur-
nishings. During some of that time they 
were open for business. 
Before the term expired, the lessees in-
formed Polster that they did not wish to 
renew the lease and it was agreed that 
Carol's Interiors would continue to occupy 
the premises until March 11, 1979, paying 
pro-rata rental from the date of lease expi-
ration until that date. After Carol's Interi-
ors surrendered the premises, Polster dis-
covered that portions of the interior, includ-
ing the ceiling, light fixtures, interior walls 
and front door were in a state of disrepair 
in violation of the lease agreement and so 
informed Carol's Interiors. 
From November 1978 through the sum-
mer of 1979, Polster listed the premises for 
lease with real estate brokers. The bro-
kers had difficulty in finding a new tenant 
due to the bad condition of the premises 
and recommended to Polster that he grant 
a repair allowance, rent concessions or a 
period of free rent to a prospective tenant 
C. v. SWING 569 
(CaLApp. 2 DUt. 1985) 
in order to obtain a new lessee. A new 
tenant was finally located and a new lease 
was executed, dated September 4, 1979, 
providing for free rent until December 1, 
1979, or until the tenant first opened for 
business to the public, whichever occurred 
first. The new tenant took possession of 
the property in the same condition it was in 
when Carol's Interiors vacated it in March, 
and then extensively remodeled the premis-
es to suit its own business needs. 
^ On April 30, 1979 Polster filed a com-
plaint against Carol's Interiors and Carol 
and Ronald Swing for breach of contract 
and conversion, praying for damages of 
$55,000.00 and interest thereon, punitive 
damages of $100,000.00, and reasonable at-
torneys' fees. 
Trial began on June 30, 1983. On No-
vember 1, 1983, the court issued its state-
ment of decision. On November 7, 1983, 
judgment was entered for {plaintiff, and on h3i 
November 22, 1983, defendants filed then-
notice of appeal from that judgment. 
CONTENTIONS 
Defendants contend: 
1. They did not violate paragraph 5 of 
the lease which provided that defendants 
had to leave the premises in as good a 
condition as when leased. 
2. The court did not apply the proper 
measure of damages. 
3. There was no evidence of diminished 
market value caused by the condition of the 
premises. 
4. Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages. 
5. Plaintiff should not have been al-
lowed to recover pre-judgment interest, be-
cause its claim was not liquidated, as found 
by the court. 
6. The award of attorneys' fees was 
excessive. 
DISCUSSION 
The Damage To The Property Exceeded 
Normal Wear and Tear 
[1] Defendant's first contention is with-
out merit The trial court found that the 
* A I 
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property had been left in a state of "gross 
disrepair and disorder" and the record am-
ply supports this finding. The record on 
appeal contains substantial evidence of 
damage to the drop ceiling, ceiling tiles, 
lighting fixtures, ceiling support bars, the 
interior walls and the front door sill and 
jamb. While the tenant is not obligated to 
renovate the premises at the expiration of 
his lease, or restore the premises to his 
landlord in a better condition than they 
were at the outset of his lease (Kanner v. 
Globe Bottling Co. (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 
559, 565-566, 78 Cal.Rptr. 25), the covenant 
to return the premises in as good a condi-
tion as when leased, excepting normal wear 
and tear, was clearly breached by the state 
in which these premises were returned to 
the lessor. 
The Court Applied the Correct Measure 
Of Damages 
Defendant contends that plaintiff may 
not recover the reasonable cost of making 
repairs to the premises without actually 
making the repairs and incurring the at-
tendant expense. Defendant is mistaken. 
I432 In Iverson v. Spang\Industries, Inc. (1975) 
45 Cal.App.3d 303, 308, 119 Cal.Rptr. 399, 
the court described the measure of dam-
ages for breach of covenant to restore 
thusly: 
"The relief to be awarded a prevailing 
lessor for breach of a covenant to restore 
the premises may be based upon one of 
three possible measures: The cost of re-
storing the premises, the diminution in 
the market value of the premises, or 
specific performance of the covenant. 
[Citation.] In the majority of jurisdic-
tions, including California, the restora-
tion principle is employed; i.e., where an 
action is brought after expiration of a 
term for breach of a lessee's covenant to 
keep the premises in repair or to surren-
der them in good repair or in a specified 
condition, the measure of damages is the 
reasonable cost of putting the demised 
premises into the required state of repair 
or the condition contemplated by the cov-
enant [Citations.] An allowance may 
also be made for the loss of rental during 
the reasonable time required to make 
such repairs or restoration. [Citations.]" 
In its statement of decision, the trial 
court found that under Iverson v. Spang 
Industries, Inc., supra, 45 Cal.App.3d 303, 
119 Cal.Rptr. 399, a proper measure of 
damages is the diminution in the market 
value of the premises due to the damage 
caused by the defendants. The trial court 
also implicitly found that where the lessor 
did not actually expend money to effect the 
necessary repairs but the same were ef-
fected by the lessor's agreement with his 
incoming tenant, evidence of the estimated 
reasonable cost of such repairs is a proper 
measure of the diminution in the market 
value of the premises. The court also al-
lowed for loss of rental for three weeks, 
finding that to be time which reasonably 
would be required to effect the necessary 
repairs. 
Civil Code section 3300, pertaining to the 
measure of damages for breach of contract 
states, in pertinent part: 
"For the breach of an obligation arising 
from contract, the measure of damages 
. . . is the amount which will compensate 
the party aggrieved for all the detriment 
proximately caused thereby, or which, in 
the ordinary course of things, would be 
likely to result therefrom." 
'The measure of damages for a breach of 
lease is that established by Civil Code sec-
tion 3300 in breach of contract cases—an 
amount which will compensate the aggriev-
ed party for all the detriment caused by the 
breach of which in the ordinary course 
would be a likely result." (Guntert v. City 
of Stockton (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 131, 142, 
126 CaLRptr. 690, 127 Cal.Rptr. 602.) 
The Iverson case, quoted above, listed 
three possible measures of damages for 
breach of the covenant to restore, noting 
that in California, the cost of restoring the 
premises is employed. (Iverson v. Spang 
Industries, Inc., supra, 45 Cal.App.3d, at 
p. 308, 119 CaLRptr. 399.) While noting 
diminution of value as one of the accepta-
ble measures of damages in the case at 
bench, the court j actually employed the es- J** 
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timated cost of restoring the premises as 
the measure of damages. 
The issue then becomes whether the esti-
mated cost of repair can be used as the 
measure of the damages which the lessor 
has sustained because of the lessee's 
breach of the covenant to restore where, as 
here, the lessor has not expended money to 
effect the necessary repairs but has caused 
the same to be effected by the lessor's 
agreement with his incoming lessee. 
While we have found no California deci-
sion directly in point, it has been held in 
other jurisdictions that the liability of a 
tenant to pay for the cost of repa:n where 
he has breached a covenant to repair, is not 
affected by the act of a subsequent tenant 
who actually makes the repairs, and that: 
"(Tjhe view has been taken that the fact 
that the landlord has, by an agreement 
with an incoming tenant or buyer, re-
lieved himself from expending his own 
money upon repairs, does not mitigate 
the lessee's obligation to pay damages 
for breaching his covenant." 
(Annot (1961) 80 A.L.R.2d 983, 1028, § 18 
and cases cited; citing Appleton v. Marx 
(1908) 191 N.Y. 81, 83 N.E. 563; In re 
Jewell (1879 DC NY) F.Cas No. 7302.) 
As we have stated above, it is beyond 
doubt that plaintiff actually suffered detri-
ment to his property, as reflected by the 
condition of disrepair in which defendants 
left it 
[2] Accordingly, we find that the trial 
court properly utilized the estimated cost 
of repairs as the measure of damage re-
sulting from the defendants' breach of the 
covenant to restore and that the evidence 
supports its findings. 
Plaintiff Properly Mitigated Its Damages 
In Leasing The Premises At A Reduced 
Rate 
[3] It is settled that a lessor, injured by 
breach of a contract must mitigate his dam-
ages. (Rubel v. Peckham (1949) 94 Cal. 
App.2d 834, 837, 211 P.2d 883.) However, 
the burden is on the lessee to prove that 
the lessor failed to mitigate. (Chappie v. 
C. v. SWING 571 
(CaLApp. 2 Dist. 1985) 
Big Bear Super Market No. 8. (1980) 108 
Cal.App.3d 867, 876, 167 Cal.Rptr. 103; 3 
Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law, (8th ed. 1973) 
Real Property, § 521, p. 2197.) 
[4] In the case at bench, plaintiff rented 
the premises to a successor tenant at re-
duced rent. That act may be construed as 
an attempt to mitigate damages. (See 
Iverson v. Spang Industries, Inc., supra, 
45 Cal.App.3d at p. 308, 119 Cal.Rptr. 399.) 
Referring to Civil Code section 1951.2, ap-
plicable where the tenant abandons the 
property before the end of term, Witkin 
quotes the Law Revision Commission in its 
Comment to that section as follows: 
"The duty to mitigate ithe damages will j434 
often require that the property be relet 
at a rent that is more or less than the 
rent provided in the original lease. The 
test in each case is whether the lessor 
acted reasonably and in good faith in 
reletting the property. [Citations.]" 
(3 Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law (8th ed. 
1973), Real Property, § 521, p. 2197.) 
[5,6] We find the same general test of 
reasonableness to be applicable in this case. 
Plaintiff produced evidence showing it real-
ized it had either to make repairs or make 
rent concessions in a successor lease, and 
that, under his financial circumstances then 
prevailing, it would be better for him to 
make such concessions. 
Defendant has failed to meet its burden 
of proving that plaintiff failed to mitigate. 
Plaintiff Was Not Entitled To Recover 
Interest From March 10, 1979, Based On 
A Liquidated Claim 
The trial court found that plaintiffs dam-
ages were based upon a liquidated claim 
because plaintiffs damages were certain, 
or capable of being made certain by calcu-
lation immediately after defendants vacat-
ed the premises, and therefore plaintiff 
was entitled to interest at the legal rate 
from the date defendants vacated on March 
10, 1979. 
Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) 
provides, in relevant part: 
"Every person who is entitled to recover 
damages certain, or capable of being 
443 
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made certain by calculation, and the 
right to recover which is vested in him 
upon a particular day, is entitled also to 
recover interest thereon from that day, 
except during such time as the debtor is 
prevented by law, or by the act of the 
creditor from paying the debt " 
[7] This section does not authorize pre-
judgment interest as a matter of law where 
the amount of damages depends upon a 
judicial determination based upon conflict-
ing evidence. (Marine Terminals Corp. v. 
Paceco, Inc. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 991, 995, 
193 Cal.Rptr. 687; Esgro Central, Inc. v. 
General Ins. Co. (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 1054, 
1062, 98 CaLRptr. 153.) * 
[8] Pre-judgment interest runs from the 
date when damages are certain or are capa-
ble of being calculated to a certainty. 
(Levy-Zentner Co. v. Southern Pac. 
Transportation Co. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 
762, 798, 142 Cal.Rptr. 1.) 
"[T]he certainty requirement of section 
3287, subdivision (a) has been reduced to 
two tests: (1) whether the debtor knows 
|43s the amount owed |or (2) whether the debtor 
would be able to compute the damages." 
(Chesapeake Industries, Inc. v. Togova 
Enterprises, Inc. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 
901, 911, 197 Cal.Rptr. 348.) 
[9] If the defendant does not know or 
cannot readily compute the damages, the 
plaintiff must supply him with a statement 
and supporting data so that defendant can 
ascertain the damages. (Levy-Zentner Co. 
v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co., su-
pra, 74 Cal.App.3d at 798, 142 Cal.Rptr. 1.) 
"[W]here a defendant does not know what 
amount he owes and cannot ascertain it 
except by accord or judicial process, he 
cannot be in default for not paying it" 
(Ia\, at p. 799, 142 CaLRptr. 1.) 
The Levy case involved damage to real 
property by fire. The court found that in 
order to apply the statutory requirement of 
certainty to the loss of market value of real 
property the estimates of expert appraisers 
were required to render the damages cer-
tain. (Id, at p. 800, 142 CaLRptr. 1.) It 
allowed interest from the date on which 
plaintiff supplied defendants with these es-
timates. (Id., at p. 801, 142 Cal.Rptr. 1.) 
In the Iverson case, supra (45 Cal. 
App.3d at p. 311, 119 Cal.Rptr. 399), the 
court found the amount expended to repair 
damage caused by a lessee was not an 
amount capable of being made certain with-
in the meaning of Civil Code section 3287, 
subdivision (a) because, pnor to the entry 
of judgment, the defendant could not have 
known what it owed plaintiff. It was im-
possible to tell what portion of costs con-
sisted of damage by prior' lessees, what 
portion constituted reasonable wear and 
tear, and what portion was caused by de-
fendant. 
In this case, there is no evidence that 
Polster supplied Carol's Interiors with ac-
curate repair estimates within a reasonable 
time after the loss. On March 5, 1979 
Polster sent Carol's Interiors a letter re-
minding it of the terms of the lease and 
describing the current unsatisfactory condi-
tion of the property, followed by a letter 
which described the damage to the proper-
ty in more detail on March 16, 1979. On 
March 10,1979, Carol's Interiors responded 
with their own description of the damages 
and an offer of settlement. It appears 
from the record that expert estimates of 
the damages were not prepared until two 
and one-half years later, in November of 
1981, and it is not clear when they were 
received by Carol's Interiors. 
[10] Further, the cases indicate that 
where there is a large discrepancy between 
the amount of damages demanded in the 
complaint and the size of the eventual 
award, that fact militates against a finding 
of the certainty mandated by Civil Code 
section 3287, subdivision (a). (See Chesa-
peake Industries, Inc. v. Togova Enter-
prises, Inc., supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 
910, 197 Cal.Rptr. 348; Marine Terminals Ji** 
Corp. v. Paceco, Inc., supra, 145 Cal. 
App.3d at p. 997, 193 Cal.Rptr. 687, where 
a small discrepancy was deemed unimpor-
tant) 
[11] In the case at bench, the amount of 
the original demand was $55,000. The 
ST\3HM, TU3GEH & CO. v. 
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amount eventually found due after the re-
ceipt of all evidence was $7,836. This large 
discrepancy is inconsistent with a sum cer-
tain or capable of being made certain at the 
time of the breach which was the basis of 
this civil action. 
Accordingly, we find that the amount 
due Polster was not a sum certain within 
the meaning of Civil Code section 3287, 
subdivision (a). 
The Subject Of Attorneys1 Fees Is Not 
Before This Court 
Carol's Interiors, appellants in this pro-
ceeding, have urged in their brief that the 
amount of attorneys' fees awarded by the 
trial court is excessive. The question of 
attorneys' fees is not before us in this 
appeal. 
[12,13] The appeal was noticed to be 
from ".. . the judgment entered . . . on 
November 7, 1983." That judgment makes 
no mention of attorneys' fees. Our juris-
diction on appeal is limited in scope to the 
notice of appeal and the judgment or order 
appealed from. Accordingly, we do not 
reach the subject of court-awarded attor-
neys' fees in this decision. 
DECISION 
The judgment as to damages and costs of 
suit is affirmed. 
That portion of the judgment awarding 
interest on damages from March 10, 1979, 
to the date of entry of judgment is strick-
en. 
Each party is to bear its own costs on 
appeal. 
LUI, Acting PJ., and ARABIAN, J., con-
cur. 
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jSTURM. RUGER & COMPANY, INC., j£7s 
et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
The SUPERIOR COURT of Sacramento 
County, Respondent, 
Buddy Ray SMITH et al., Real 
Parties in Interest. 
Civ. 24664. 
Court of Appeal, Third District. 
Feb. 7, 1985. 
Application for writ of mandate was 
filed to review the denial by the Superior 
Court of petitioners' motion for summary 
judgment. The Court of Appeal, Puglia, 
PJ„ held that the petition for writ of man-
date was not timely filed on December 21, 
1984 where the written notice of entry of 
the court's minute order denying summary 
judgment was mailed to all parties by the 
Superior Court clerk on November 26, 
1984. 
Writ denied. 
1. Mandamus <s=>143(l, 2) 
In the absence of a specific statutory 
provision an appellate court may consider a 
petition for extraordinary writ at any time 
subject to its discretionary power to deny 
relief on the grounds of laches. 
2. Mandamus e=»143(l) 
Petition for writ of mandate to review 
the denial of petitioners' motion for sum-
mary judgment was not timely filed on 
December 21, 1984 where the written no-
tice of entry of the court's minute order 
denying summary judgment was mailed to 
all parties by the superior court clerk on 
November 26, 1984. West's Ann. Cal.C. 
C.P. §437c(Z). 
Hoge, Fenton, Jones & Appel, Inc., and 
John W. Appel, San Jose, for petitioners. 
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§3281 CIVIL CODE 706 
§ 3281. Compensation for Illegal Act 
Every person who suffers detriment from the unlaw-
ful act or omission of another, may recover from the 
person in fault a compensation therefor in money, 
which is called damages. 
(1872) 
§ 3282. Detriment—Definition 
Detriment is a loss or harm suffered in person or 
property. 
(1872) 
§ 3283. Award of Damages for Past or Certain 
Future Detriment 
Damages may be awarded, in a judicial proceeding, 
for detriment resulting after the commencement thereof, 
or certain to result in the future. 
(1872) 
ARTICLE 2 
Interest As Damages 
Interest on Recovered Damages. § 3287 
Discretion of Jury for Giving Interest on Certain 
Damages. § 3288 
Continuation of Stipulated Interest in Breached Contract. 
§3289 
Prejudgment Interest. § 3289.5 
Waiver of Interest Claim. § 3290 
Interest Claim in Personal Injury Action—Interest Rate. 
§ 3291 
§ 3287. Interest on Recovered Damages 
(a) Every person who is entitled to recover damages 
certain, or capable of being made certain by calcula-
tion, and the right to recover which is vested in him 
upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest 
thereon from that day, except during such time as the 
debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor 
from paying the debt. This section is applicable to re-
covery of damages and interest from any such debtor, 
including the state or any county, city, city and county, 
municipal corporation, public district, public agency, or 
any political subdivision of the state. 
(b) Every person who is entitled under any judgment 
to receive damages based upon a cause of action in 
contract where the claim was unliquidated, may also 
recover interest thereon from a date prior to the entry 
of judgment as the court may, in its discretion, fix, but 
in no event earlier than the date the action was fried. 
(1872, 1955 ch. 1477, 1959 ch. 1735, 1967 ch. 
1230) 
§ 3288. Discretion of Jury for Giving Interest on 
Certain Damages 
In an action for the breach of an obligation not aris-
ing from contract, and in every case of oppression, 
fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discre-
tion of the jury. 
(1872) 
§ 3289. Continuation of Stipulated Interest in 
Breached Contract 
(a) Any legal rate of interest stipulated by a contract 
remains chargeable after a breach thereof, as before, 
until the contract is superseded by a verdict or other 
new obligation. 
(b) If a contract entered into after January I, 1986. 
does not stipulate a legal rate of interest, the obligation 
shall bear interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum 
after a breach. 
For the purposes of this subdivision, the term con-
tract shall not include a note secured by a deed of trust 
on real property. 
(1872, 1985 ch. 663, 1986 ch. 176 urgency eff. 
June 23, 1986) 
§ 3289.5. Prejudgment Interest 
For purposes of Section 3289, the rate of the con-
tracted finance charge shall be the legal rate of interest 
stipulated by a retail installment contract subject to 
Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 1801) of Title 2 
of Part 4 of Division 3. 
(1985 ch. 224) 
§ 3290. Waiver of Interest Claim 
Accepting payment of the whole principal, as such, 
waives all claim to interest. 
(1872) 
§ 3291. Interest Claim in Personal Injury 
Action—Interest Rate 
In any action brought to recover damages for per-
sonal injury sustained by any person resulting from or 
occasioned by the tort of any other person, corporation, 
association, or partnership, whether by negligence or 
by willful intent of the other person, corporation, as-
sociation, or partnership, and whether the injury was 
fatal or otherwise, it is lawful for the plaintiff in the 
complaint to claim interest on the damages alleged as 
provided in this section. 
If the plaintiff makes an offer pursuant to Section 
998 of the Code of Civil Procedure which the defendant 
does not accept prior to trial or within 30 days, which-
ever occurs first, and the plaintiff obtains a more favor-
able judgment, the judgment shall bear interest at the 
legal rate of 10 percent per annum calculated from the 
date of the plaintiff's first offer pursuant to Section 998 
of the Code of Civil Procedure which is exceeded by 
GENERAL PROVISIONS §3295 
- judgment, and interest shall accrue until the satis-
J ^ n of judgment. 
^ J ^ J 5 section shall not apply to a public entity, or to 
lablic employee for an act or omission within the 
i i c of employment, and neither the public entity nor 
J^ ib l i c employee shall be liable, directly or indirect-
^•Tany person for any interest imposed by this sec-
**' (1982 ch. 150) 
ijole: This act governs the rate of interest on a judgment 
^-ed on or after January 1, 1982, and the rate of interest on 
l i f t e r January 1, 1982, on a judgment entered before Jan-
JJ^l. 1982. (1982 ch. 150) 
ARTICLE 3 
Exemplary Damages 
ff^BpUry and Punitive Damages. § 3294 
ptjlective Order. § 3295 
§ 1294- Exemplary and Punitive Damages 
(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not 
rising from contract, where it is proven by clear and 
c00vincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty 
of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addi-
non to the actual damages, may recover damages for 
Ac sake of example and by way of punishing the de-
fendant. 
(b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pur-
joant to subdivision (a), based upon the acts of an em-
ployee of the employer, unless the employer had 
advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee 
mi employed him or her with a conscious disregard of 
che rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified 
Jte wrongful conduct for which the damages are award-
ed or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or 
malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the ad-
vance knowledge and conscious disregard, authoriza-
tion, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice 
•Mist be on the part of an officer, director, or managing 
agent of the corporation. 
(c) As used in this section, the following definitions 
shafl apply: 
(1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by 
t e defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despic-
able conduct which is carried on by the defendant with 
a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety 
of others. 
(2) "Oppression" means despicable conduct that 
•ejects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in con-
taous disregard of that person*s rights. 
(3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, 
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the 
defendant with the intention on the part of the defend-
ant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal 
rights or otherwise causing injury. 
(d) Damages may be recovered pursuant to this sec-
tion in an action pursuant to Section 377 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure or Section 573 of the Probate Code 
based upon a death which resulted from a homicide for 
which the defendant has been convicted of a felony, 
whether or not the decedent died instantly or survived 
the fatal injury for some period of time. The procedures 
for joinder and consolidation contained in Section 377 
of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to prevent 
multiple recoveries of punitive or exemplary damages 
based upon the same wrongful act. 
(e) The amendments to this section made by Chapter 
1498 of the Statutes of 1987 apply to aJI actions in 
which the initial trial has not commenced prior to Jan-
uary 1, 1988. 
(1872, 1905 ch. 463. 1980 ch. 1242, 1982 ch. 
174, 1983 ch. 408, 1987 ch. 1498, 1988 ch. 160) 
§ 3295. Protective Order 
(a) The court may, for good cause, grant any de-
fendant a protective order requiring the plaintiff to pro-
duce evidence of a prima facie case of liability for 
damages pursuant to Section 3294, prior to the intro-
duction of evidence of: 
(1) The profits the defendant has gained by virtue of 
the wrongful course of conduct of the nature and type 
shown by the evidence. 
(2) The financial condition of the defendant. 
(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the intro-
duction of prima facie evidence to establish a case fen-
damages pursuant to Section 3294. 
(c) No pretrial discovery by the plaintiff shall be 
permitted with respect to the evidence referred to in 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) unless the 
court enters an order permitting such discovery pursuant 
to this subdivision. However, the plaintiff may subpoe-
na documents or witnesses to be available at the trial 
for the purpose of establishing the profits or financial 
condition referred to in subdivision (a), and the defend-
ant may be required to identify documents in the de-
fendant's possession which are relevant and admissible 
for that purpose and the witnesses employed by or re-
lated to the defendant who would be most competent to 
testify to those facts. Upon motion by the plaintiff sup-
ported by appropriate affidavits and after a hearing, if 
the court deems a hearing to be necessary, the court 
may at any time enter an order permitting the discovery 
otherwise prohibited by this subdivision if the court 
finds, on the basis of the supporting and opposing af-
fidavits presented, that the plaintiff has established that 
there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will 
prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294. Such 
order shall not be considered to be a determination on 
the merits of the claim or any defense thereto and shaJI 
not be given in evidence or referred to at the triaJ. 
ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1666 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. SHOWALTER, 
dba ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC., 
an Ohio Corporation, and 
JOHN P. CANNON, individually, 
Defendants. 
OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TRIAL 
Civil No. 92400108PD 
Judge Ray M. Marding 
In clarifying the Court's memory of the evidence it 
should be kept in mind that the original ownership of the rig 
in question was intended to vest in Carl D. Martin and 
plaintiff was merely financing the rig venture for Martin. 
Under date of June 14, 1991, Martin had not paid the debt 
against the rig to plaintiff and plaintiff obtained a Bill of 
Sale from Martin covering the rig and appurtenances. 
Thereafter plaintiff became obligated to pay all expenditures 
E. 
necessary to work the rig until he could sell it and recoup 
the monies paid out to purchase and revamp the rig, keeping in 
mind that the Kayenta contract was the first contract after 
plaintiff acquired ownership of the rig. With this summary of 
the evidence, plaintiff objects to the Court's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
1. Finding No. 12 should read "tractor-semis over 
30• king pin to rear axle rather than read axle". 
2. Plaintiff objects to Finding No. 17 in that it 
is incomplete and from the evidence should additionally state 
"prior to the Kayenta job". 
3. Plaintiff objects to Finding No. 18 in that it 
should read: "Plaintiff never made any money from the rig 
because of modifications, regearing, tools, augers and 
revamping of the rig to function for the use he intended to 
put the rig to work exceeded its income". 
4. Finding No. 19 should be amended to read "Prior 
to the Kayenta job for defendants plaintiff had been 
attempting to sell the rig, but was unable to do so." 
5. Plaintiff objects to Finding No. 20 as being an 
incomplete statement. Plaintiff submits it should read 
"Plaintiff's business at the time of this accident had not 
been well established, however the evidence showed that new 
-2-
business for the modified rig was beginning to become a 
reality as plaintiff would have had a net profit on the 
Highway 1 job in California for Coast GEO Construction of 
$34/280.78, which job the rig was enroute to at the time of 
the accident. Plaintiff also had a net profit of $32,437.59 
on the Kayenta job for defendants. 
6. Plaintiff objects to the Court's Finding 21(a) 
stating that the rig had a value of $97,000.00. The purchase 
price of the rig was $87,000.00. Shipping and Customs were 
11,877.25 for a total of $108,877.25. After receiving the rig 
in the United States, plaintiff spent $12,908.90 to regear the 
rig, purchase tools, augers and other necessary equipment to 
adapt it for plaintiff's intended type of work which plaintiff 
intended to put the rig in use to perform. The total amount 
spent by plaintiff prior to the Kayenta job was $174,092.25. 
This amount is obtained from plaintiff's Exhibit 47 by adding 
the total of purchase, shipping, customs and expeditures to 
modify the rig from the date of the purchase until the Dalton 
Trucking bill of September 9, 1991, (Exhibit 9), which is 
reflected as an expense for the Kayenta job. 
Plaintiff submits that the following additional 
findings should be made by the Court. 
24. The drill rig in question was a one of a kind 
rig and no other duplicate rig has ever been manufactured with 
the drilling capabilities unique to it. 
-3-
25. A comparable, but less than identical drill rig 
can be purchased in the United States for between $600,000.00 
and $650,000.00. 
26. Had plaintiff's rig not been damaged, but being 
worked with its new modifications at a bare minimum of 130 
days per year as evidenced by the job solicitations to 
plaintiff's agent, Carl Martin, both from the defendant 
company and other sources, which with the net profit on the 
job the rig was in route to, would have shown a net profit 
after very liberal charging of expenses to plaintiff of a 
minimum of $112,000.00 per year. 
27. Repairs still needed to restore the rig to its 
former operable condition are in the sum of $20,000.00 
according to defendants' own testimony. 
DATED this of March, 1993. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy 
of the foregoing to the following on this ) 1^tfay~of March, 
1993. 
-4-
Mr. Lynn B. Larsen 
Attorney for Defendant 
1000 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
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CANNON STRUCTURES, INC., an Ohio 
corporation, and JOHN P. CANNON, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 920400108 PD 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court has received plaintiffs Amendment to Objections of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (wherein plaintiff essentially reasserts its objections filed March 15, 
1993), and defendants' objection thereto. Plaintiff begins his amended objections 
complaining that defendants' "objections" (apparently referring to defendant's Objection to 
Plaintiffs Proposed Form of Judgement) were untimely and erroneously filed, and therefore 
erroneously considered by the Court. Plaintiff is mistaken. 
F. 
The Court directs plaintiffs counsel's attention to the language of Rule 4-504(2) 
CJ.A. which clearly provides for the filing of objections to a proposed judgement within 5 
days of the service of such proposed judgement. In the present case, defendant filed his 
objections to the form of the proposed judgement on February 22, 1993, after receiving the 
proposed judgement on February 19, 1993. Accordingly, the objections were timely filed 
and properly before the Court for ruling. In fact, in plaintiffs counsel's letter to the Court's 
law clerk, dated March 5, 1993, plaintiffs counsel, himself, indicates that ". . .the form of 
the Judgement and Larsen's objections thereto are properly before the Court." 
After full consideration of plaintiffs pending objections, the Court overrules all such 
objections with the exception of plaintiffs identification of a typographical error contained 
in Finding No. 12. The finding should indicate "rear axle" rather than "read axle." All 
other objections involve substantive issues which the Court duly considered and rejected prior 
to making its factual findings in this case. Moreover, plaintiff has asserted no justifiable 
basis for its alternative motion for new trial. 
Plaintiff has also filed a "Motion to Add Interest." The motion is clearly 
inappropriate in that the Court fully considered and disposed of the issue of pre-judgement 
interest under California law in its Memorandum Decision of March 15, 1993. Plaintiff had 
adequate opportunity to address the issue prior to the issuing of the Court's decision, and in 
fact submitted relevant California cases, to which the Court gave due consideration prior to 
making its ruling on the issue. 
The Court has also received plaintiffs Amended Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements, and defendants' objection thereto. After full consideration, the Court finds 
that all specified costs and disbursements may be appropriately assessed against defendant, 
with the exception of the costs for the deposition of Jay Ferris, which was not introduced at 
trial and does not appear to have been reasonable necessary for purposes of this litigation. 
The Court has now entered final rulings on all issues in this case. The parties are 
free to appeal the Court's decision on any issue, if they so desire. 
Counsel for defendants is to prepare a judgement within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval 
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 20th day of May, 1993. 
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<M-'.X.r"'0V3*' 
ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1666 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. SHOWALTER, 
dba ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC., 
an Ohio Corporation, and 




NOTICE OF APPEAL y 
Civil No. 920400108PD 
Judge: Ray M. Harding 
Notice is hereby given that plaintiff and appellant, 
Robert D. Showalter# through counsel, Robert M. McRae, appeals 
to the Utah Supreme Court the Amendment to Judgment entered 
June 4, 1993 and Judgment entered April 6, 1993 of the 
Honorable Ray M. Harding. The appeal is taken from the entire 
Judgment. 
DATED this rT day of June# 1993. 
McRAE & 
G. 
ROBERT M. MCRAE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following on this |T 
day of June, 1993. 
Mr. Lynn B. Larsen 
Attorney for Defendants 
1000 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
ROBERT M. McRAI 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
DEC'01^91 ^4:52^CDRSW^E0-C0flST- P".21 
SECTJON 24 ATTORNEYS FEES 
In the event the parties become involved in trttgat on or ai b tration with each o the-arising oui of th £ Agreement or other 
performance thereof in vrtttch the services of an aviorney or other expert are reasontib'y rsqimed tfro pro>'a{'mg pen / sha!1 be 
fully compensated for the cos v* {& participation »n seen proceedings, including the cost incurred tor attorneys fees and 
experts* tees Unless judgment jc^s by oe'autt th« attorr ic> s fee a\sard shall not be compiled m sccord&nce vwth any court 
schedule butshaUbe sucha$ to tull/ re ^ t j i s e aila*ion e^s 'ees e ^ j a l l / i i cuTod in good faitn Je-Qard^si of t \Q size of a 
judgment, it being the ir ienlion or th& pi i i ios to fU(> co° ^e^s tft <o< z\( attorneys fess and experts fees paid or incurred «n 
|)ood faith 
SECTJON25 l ^ J B Q R A S B E £ J & I i J 5 'LiStlah.r ^ r e - r e i»< 
has no labor agreements ) 
^ 4 h r h Contractor «s Signatory or enter NONE cf Contractor 
S t a t e of Cal i io^n*rf C<?rpento> ? CeTt^t Ms.son3 , L a b o r e r s , 
O p e r a t i n g E n g i n e e r s ar*a Teeii 5, fprs 
SECTJON 26 SPECIAL PROVISIONS Including
 wr 1 pr >»ng r* app» cable) 
Subcon t r ac to r w i l l O r n i s h an J m ^ t d i l the fo l l owing itecof . 
Item Description Quantity Unit Price 
H5~ Dnl l 24n+ Shaft and Set Item* 
#15 Mobil izatj on for Driving 
• 3 2 0 LF 0 ? ~ 3 ^ "<•*> 
lis? SUJU £ 
Total: 
Amo»*i t 
tv^TH > U [&61Z.V <=>r. A - ^ r r ^ *~l~/r«,^> ^ , ^ o c , , ^ k ^ T r ^ E#9fcfc£!. C 5 S £ 
Exhibit "A*1 13 attner-'**! to ud ^ ^ a rsM: cf i n s iaib^ont*-^^ » 
CONTRACTORS ARE REQUIRED BY i AW TC EE LtCbMSED AND PEGU'-ATEO B v "HHt CONTPAC^C'no STATE 
UCENSEBOARD ANY QUESTIONS CCNCPV-J NO / C0N~RAC"»C0 r 1 * v e f S E ^ L •>> L^TC ~ -u >< i - J~ 
THE BOARD WHOSE ADDhfcSS iS 
Co r t r i o r s b ^ e License Board 
t Josi r "* ' r * Bex 26000 
Cea«3rre~* C^Uo^a 95826 
Dated: j l 3 £ - e\ 
CONTRACT0S: Coast Geo-Constructor5 , Irio 
l^ited. December 2 , 1991 
Rocky Mountain D r i l l i n g SUBCONTRACTOR: 
*<-&n&%-"' *A^4j|^"n" ) 
150 Executive Park Blvd., Suite 3600 
San Francisco, CA 94132! 
(Addre33) 
1140566 A, B, C-57 & C-61 
(Contractor's License No.) 
2700 West 1500 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(Address) 
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